IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER: This guide references NFPA 75, Standard for the Fire Protection of Information Technology Equipment, and NFPA 76, Standard for the Fire Protection of Telecommunications Facilities. Where existing building rehabilitation is involved, NFPA 101, Chapter 43 (Building Rehabilitation) and NFPA 914, Code for the Protection of Historic Structures, may apply. However, NFPA 101 and NFPA 914 requirements vary significantly by edition (2018, 2021, 2023) and are frequently amended by state and local jurisdictions. Local amendments and the edition adopted by your Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) always control. This guide is a starting point only—always verify the specific requirements applicable to your project with your local AHJ.
Data centers present one of the most complex fire safety challenges in modern commercial construction. The assets they protect—servers, storage, network equipment—are extraordinarily valuable, and the services they enable are often critical to business operations, public safety, and daily life. A fire that damages a data center doesn’t just destroy equipment; it can paralyze organizations, disrupt essential services, and cost millions in downtime.
Yet the fire safety strategy for a data center cannot simply mirror that of an office building or warehouse. Water-based suppression that works well in a warehouse can destroy the very equipment it’s meant to protect. And the unique fire risks inside a data center—from lithium-ion batteries to high-density AI compute loads—require specialized approaches.
This guide covers the fire safety requirements and best practices for data centers, based on NFPA 75 and NFPA 76, along with real-world lessons from data center fires.
◆ Section 1: Why Data Centers Are Different
Data centers are not simply rooms full of computers. They are specialized facilities with unique fire risk profiles and operational requirements.
| Factor | Challenge |
|---|---|
| High-value assets | Servers and storage represent millions in capital investment; fire damage can be catastrophic |
| Continuous operation | Downtime is unacceptable; suppression must work without powering down equipment |
| Sensitive electronics | Water, corrosion, and residue can damage equipment as much as fire |
| High-density loads | AI workloads concentrate 20–40 kW per rack, creating localized thermal stress |
| Lithium-ion batteries | UPS and energy storage systems introduce thermal runaway risks |
| Complex cooling | Liquid cooling introduces new interfaces and potential leak points |
| Redundancy requirements | Fire protection must integrate with N+1 or 2N power and cooling architectures |
The focus in data center fire protection has shifted from mere code compliance to business continuity—operators and investors now weigh how quickly systems can be restored after an incident and what level of collateral damage a site can accept.
Pro Tip: Fire protection now appears much earlier in the design process for data centers, taking place alongside electrical and mechanical engineering, zoning and compartmentation planning, and cooling strategy decisions. Treating it as a late-stage add-on creates expensive retrofits and compromises.
◆ Section 2: The Regulatory Framework
A. NFPA 75 — Information Technology Equipment
NFPA 75, Standard for the Fire Protection of Information Technology Equipment (2024 edition), sets forth minimum requirements for the protection of ITE equipment and ITE areas from damage by fire or its associated effects—smoke, corrosion, heat, and water.
Key chapters cover:
- Fire protection approaches and fire risk assessment (Chapter 4)
- Performance-based design (Chapter 5)
- Construction requirements (Chapter 6)
- Fire protection and detection equipment (Chapter 9)
- Utilities including HVAC, coolant systems, and UPS (Chapter 11)
- Emergency and recovery procedures (Chapter 12)
- Modular data centers (Chapter 13)
B. NFPA 76 — Telecommunications Facilities
NFPA 76 addresses fire protection for telecommunications facilities, including landline, cable, wireless, and satellite services. The 2024 edition removed lithium-ion battery requirements in favor of coverage in NFPA 855, added off-gas detection requirements, and revised cable management requirements.
C. Related Standards
| Standard | Application |
|---|---|
| NFPA 2001 | Clean agent fire extinguishing systems |
| NFPA 750 | Water mist fire protection systems |
| NFPA 855 | Stationary energy storage systems (now covers lithium-ion batteries) |
| NFPA 72 | Fire alarm and detection |
| NEMA BS 31060-2025 | Design considerations for fire and life safety equipment in data centers |
Pro Tip: The 2024 editions of NFPA 75 and NFPA 76 are the current benchmarks. Ensure your design team is working from the most recent editions, as significant changes—particularly around lithium-ion batteries—have been made.
◆ Section 3: Fire Risk Profile — What Actually Burns
Understanding what burns in a data center is essential to designing effective protection.
| Fire Hazard | Description | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|
| Cable insulation | PVC and other polymers in cable trays and under raised floors | High |
| Server components | Circuit boards, plastic housings, internal wiring | Moderate |
| Lithium-ion batteries (UPS) | Thermal runaway can exceed 1,000°C; resists conventional suppression | Critical |
| Cooling fluids | Some liquid cooling fluids may be combustible or contribute to fire spread | Variable |
| Combustible construction | Raised floor materials, ceiling tiles, decorative finishes | Low–Moderate |
| Housekeeping materials | Packaging, paper records, cleaning supplies | Low |
The South Korea NIRS data center fire in September 2025 began with a lithium-ion battery explosion during routine UPS battery relocation. The fire required 170 firefighters and 63 fire trucks, took 22 hours to extinguish, destroyed 384 lithium-ion batteries and 96 critical IT systems, and disrupted 709 government systems .
Key lesson: Lithium-ion battery fires in data centers are not hypothetical. The NIRS incident followed a 2022 SK C&C data center fire that disrupted KakaoTalk, and South Korea recorded 55 UPS-related fires between 2018 and 2022.

◆ Section 4: Detection — Very Early Warning
In data centers, detecting a fire at the incipient stage is critical. By the time a traditional point detector activates, smoke may already be damaging equipment.
A. Aspirating Smoke Detection (ASD)
Aspirating smoke detection systems continuously draw air samples from protected areas through a network of pipes to a central detector. They are purpose-designed for applications where very early warning and system stability are critical, including data centers.
Modern ASD systems incorporate blue light technology to improve sensitivity to the very small smoke particles typically associated with incipient fires, providing faster response while maintaining stability in normal operating conditions.
| Feature | Benefit |
|---|---|
| Very early warning | Detection before visible smoke or flame |
| Blue light technology | Improved sensitivity to small particles |
| Smart Smoke Level algorithm | Dynamic baseline adjusts to background contamination |
| On-board programming | Configuration without laptops (useful in secure facilities) |
| Extensive event logging | Post-event analysis and trend identification |
B. Off-Gas Detection
NFPA 76 (2024) added requirements for off-gas detection. This technology detects the gases released by overheating batteries before thermal runaway occurs.
C. Detection Zoning
| Area | Detection Strategy |
|---|---|
| Data halls | Aspirating smoke detection at return air and in aisles |
| UPS/battery rooms | Off-gas detection plus ASD |
| Power rooms | ASD or traditional spot detection |
| Cable entrance facilities | ASD |
| Ceiling voids and raised floors | ASD sampling points |
Pro Tip: Early detection is not just about alarm activation—it’s about initiating suppression before a fire reaches the flame stage. Clean agents act fastest when the fire is still in its incipient phase.
◆ Section 5: Suppression — Clean Agents and Alternatives
A. Clean Agent Systems
Clean agents are the preferred suppression for data halls because they are electrically non-conductive, leave no residue, and do not require equipment shutdown before discharge.
| Clean Agent Type | Examples | Discharge Time |
|---|---|---|
| Halocarbon | HFC-227ea (FM-200), HFC-125, Novec 1230 | ≤10 seconds |
| Inert Gas | IG-541 (Inergen), IG-55, IG-100 | ≤60 seconds |
Clean agents extinguish fires primarily by absorbing heat rather than removing oxygen, allowing them to act fast—discharge within 10 seconds and fire extinguished within 30 seconds, generally before reaching the flame stage.
Agent Concentration and Safety: Any agent used under NFPA 2001 must be evaluated per EPA SNAP requirements. Manufacturer manuals contain LOAEL (Lowest Observable Adverse Effect Level) and NOAEL (No Observed Adverse Effect Level) data. Safeguards must include personnel training, warning signs, discharge alarms, SCBA, evacuation plans, and fire drills.
B. Water Mist Systems
NFPA 75 (2024) includes provisions for water mist fire protection systems. Water mist uses significantly less water than traditional sprinklers and may be suitable for certain data center areas. However, the impact on equipment must be carefully evaluated.
C. Water-Based Suppression
Traditional sprinklers are generally not the first choice for data halls due to water damage risk. Discharging water in an enclosed space can increase humidity beyond safe levels, leading to hard disk drive performance problems or failure. ASHRAE guidelines indicate equipment should be powered down when humidity exceeds 80%.
However, water-based suppression may still be required or appropriate for:
- Building areas outside the ITE space
- Generator halls and power rooms
- Storage areas
- As a backup to clean agent systems
Pro Tip: Standards compliance for suppression systems must be on three levels: component, system, and installation. Use only systems with system approval/certification, or insurance may be invalidated and the system may not work as intended.
◆ Section 6: Lithium-Ion Battery Fire Safety
Lithium-ion batteries in UPS systems represent the most significant emerging fire risk in data centers.
| Risk Factor | Detail |
|---|---|
| Thermal runaway | Can exceed 1,000°C; resists conventional firefighting |
| Battery age | Batteries past 10-year lifespan have elevated risk; NIRS batteries were installed August 2014 |
| Proximity to servers | NIRS batteries were positioned just 60 cm from major servers |
| Simplified safety design | UPS batteries often have fewer safety layers than large-scale ESS |
| Human error | Disconnection procedures can trigger voltage spikes and thermal runaway |
Regulatory Note: NFPA 76 (2024) removed lithium-ion battery requirements in favor of coverage in NFPA 855, Standard for the Installation of Stationary Energy Storage Systems. Ensure your design team is familiar with NFPA 855 requirements for UPS battery installations.
Pro Tip: The NIRS fire occurred during routine maintenance—battery relocation intended to reduce fire risk. This underscores that battery handling procedures are as important as system design. Develop and enforce strict protocols for battery disconnection, relocation, and disposal.
◆ Section 7: Compartmentation and Construction
A. ITE Area Location
NFPA 75 addresses the location of ITE areas within buildings, interior construction materials, raised floors, and penetrations in fire-resistant-rated enclosures.
| Element | Requirement |
|---|---|
| ITE area location | Separated from other occupancies by fire-rated construction |
| Interior finishes | Limited combustibility |
| Raised floors | Non-combustible or limited-combustible materials |
| Penetrations | Firestopped to maintain rating |
| Aisle containment | Addressed in NFPA 75 Chapter 6 |
B. Modern Design Challenges
Modern data centers operate as collections of specialist rooms and zones rather than a single uniform hall. Data halls, UPS and battery rooms, medium- and low-voltage electrical rooms, generator halls, cooling plants, and storage areas each have distinct hazards and operational constraints. This segmentation increases pressure for site-specific fire protection approaches.
Pro Tip: The era of applying a single fire protection standard across an entire data center site is over. Each zone requires protection aligned with its function, hazard profile, and recovery objectives.
◆ Section 8: Operational Continuity vs. Code Compliance
The data center industry has shifted its focus from compliance as a primary driver to business continuity. Fire protection decisions are now evaluated based on their impact on uptime and recovery, not suppression performance alone.
| Consideration | Traditional Approach | Modern Approach |
|---|---|---|
| Primary driver | Code compliance | Business continuity |
| Design timing | Late-stage add-on | Early concept and detailed design |
| Evaluation criteria | Suppression performance | Impact on uptime and recovery |
| Site approach | Uniform standard | Site-specific, zone-by-zone |
| Recovery planning | Damage control | Pre-incident planning and rapid restoration |
The Almere data center fire in May 2026 demonstrated that redundancy at the data center level does not automatically mean end users are protected. The fire broke out in a utility room housing emergency power, cooling systems, and diesel backup generators. NorthC shut off power to the data halls on the fire brigade’s instructions to enable safe firefighting. The outage cascaded to every organization with platforms hosted at the site—including Transdev, whose control-center servers for the regional public transport emergency communication system had never been migrated to a backup location. Drivers lost contact with the control room, and the in-vehicle emergency button stopped functioning.
The Infrastructure That Failed — Not the IT Halls
The Almere facility spans 26,000 m² with an 11 MW electrical connection. Yet the fire did not start in the data halls. It broke out in a utility room housing the emergency power supply, cooling systems, and diesel backup generators. That separation succeeded: the servers survived. But the power, cooling, and emergency systems that made them operational were destroyed or shut down.
This is the zone-by-zone reality of modern data center design. The IT halls may be protected, but the facility is only as resilient as its weakest supporting system. When the utility infrastructure fails, the IT halls become expensive storage rooms.
Key lesson: Digital continuity begins not only with IT, but with the building itself. Investing in building automation and integrated fire safety is a prerequisite for keeping vital functions safe.
◆ Section 9: Case Study — South Korea NIRS Data Center Fire
The September 2025 fire at South Korea’s National Information Resources Service (NIRS) data center is the most instructive data center fire incident in recent years.
Timeline and Impact:
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| Sept 26, ~8:16 PM | Fire ignited in UPS room on 5th floor during battery relocation |
| Fire duration | 22 hours to extinguish |
| Resources deployed | 170 firefighters, 63 fire trucks |
| Equipment destroyed | 384 lithium-ion batteries, 96 critical IT systems |
| Systems affected | Initially 647; later revised to 709 |
| Data restored as of Oct 2 | 112 of 647 (17.31%) |
| Full recovery projection | Up to 4 weeks |
Root Causes:
- Single point of failure: Over one-third of government systems were concentrated at the Daejeon headquarters. The NIRS had three sites but lacked active-active redundancy for real-time failover.
- Battery proximity: Batteries were positioned just 60 cm from major servers, with inadequate partitioning between the power room and server room .
- Battery age: The LG Energy Solution batteries were installed in August 2014, exceeding their 10-year recommended lifespan by over a year .
- Maintenance procedure: Police investigation found that while the main power was shut down, the auxiliary power system connected to the UPS battery backup was not isolated. Workers failed to follow safety protocols, did not use required insulation materials, and failed to properly discharge the batteries before moving them . The batteries were at approximately 80% charge; guidelines require below 30% for safe relocation . Additionally, the workers involved were not qualified for the job, had no experience in battery relocation, and the contractors did not involve the battery manufacturers. The project involved illegal subcontracting with falsified employee records .
Data Loss and Human Cost
Beyond the operational disruption, the NIRS fire resulted in the permanent loss of approximately 858 TB of government data stored on G-Drive, a shared cloud storage service for central government officials . Unlike the other 95 destroyed systems, G-Drive had no backup—officials cited its massive capacity as the reason backups were deemed impractical . One official described the loss as “eight years’ worth of work materials” that had “completely disappeared” .
The human toll extended beyond data. On October 3, 2025, a 56-year-old Interior Ministry official who led the recovery effort was found dead at the government complex in Sejong . Police stated he appeared to have jumped from a 15th-floor terrace smoking area, leaving his phone behind . The Ministry of the Interior and Safety expressed condolences and canceled a scheduled briefing . The official was not a subject of the criminal investigation into the fire .
Lessons:
- Lithium-ion UPS batteries require separation from IT equipment and strict maintenance protocols
- Active-active redundancy, not just backup sites, is essential for critical infrastructure
- Battery replacement timelines must be enforced
- Firefighting challenges with lithium-ion fires require pre-incident planning
- Business continuity must include data survivability, not just uptime
- Maintenance procedures must be verified—not assumed—before work begins
- Contractor qualifications and oversight are fire safety controls
◆ Section 10: Design Checklist for Data Center Fire Safety
| Item | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Fire Risk Assessment | ☐ | Per NFPA 75 Chapter 4 |
| NFPA 75/76 Compliance | ☐ | Current 2024 editions |
| Aspirating Smoke Detection | ☐ | Very early warning in data halls |
| Off-Gas Detection | ☐ | UPS/battery rooms |
| Clean Agent Suppression | ☐ | NFPA 2001 compliant; LOAEL/NOAEL verified |
| Water Mist Evaluation | ☐ | Where appropriate per NFPA 75 |
| Lithium-Ion Battery Protection | ☐ | NFPA 855 compliance; separation from ITE |
| Compartmentation | ☐ | Fire-rated separation of ITE areas |
| Aisle Containment | ☐ | Fire performance addressed |
| Emergency Power and Depowering | ☐ | Selective depowering capability |
| Pre-Fire Planning | ☐ | Fire service coordination; lithium-ion protocols |
| Business Continuity Plan | ☐ | Recovery time objectives documented |
| Personnel Training | ☐ | Clean agent safety; battery handling |
| Maintenance Procedure Verification | ☐ | Confirm lockout/tagout protocols; spot-check contractor work |
| Contractor Qualification Verification | ☐ | Confirm experience and certifications for battery work |
◆ Section 11: Common Mistakes and How to Avoid Them
| Mistake | Why It’s a Problem | How to Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Treating fire protection as late-stage add-on | Expensive retrofits; compromises design | Integrate fire protection from concept phase |
| Assuming water sprinklers are acceptable for data halls | Water damage can exceed fire damage | Use clean agents or water mist where appropriate |
| Ignoring lithium-ion battery risks | Thermal runaway is extremely difficult to control | Comply with NFPA 855; separate batteries from ITE |
| Using component-certified but system-unapproved suppression | System may not work; insurance may be invalidated | Require system-level approval and installation certification |
| Neglecting off-gas detection | Misses early warning of battery failure | Install off-gas detection in UPS rooms |
| Over-concentrating critical systems | Single point of failure | Implement active-active redundancy across sites |
| Skipping pre-incident planning | Firefighters unprepared for lithium-ion hazards | Coordinate with fire service; document hazards |
| Assuming backup exists without verification | Data loss may be permanent and irreversible | Implement 3-2-1 backup rule; test recovery regularly |
| Assuming maintenance procedures are followed | Human error can trigger catastrophic failure | Verify lockout/tagout; audit contractor work |
| Using unqualified contractors for critical work | Inexperience with specialized systems increases risk | Verify qualifications; require manufacturer involvement |
◆ Section 12: Conclusion
Data center fire protection is not a commodity—it is a specialized discipline that requires understanding of unique hazards, specialized suppression technologies, and the operational realities of continuous uptime environments.
Key Takeaways:
- NFPA 75 and NFPA 76 are the governing standards for ITE and telecommunications facilities, with significant updates in the 2024 editions.
- Clean agents are preferred for data halls because they are non-conductive, leave no residue, and act before the flame stage.
- Aspirating smoke detection provides very early warning essential for protecting sensitive electronics.
- Lithium-ion batteries are the most significant emerging risk and require NFPA 855 compliance, separation from ITE, and strict maintenance protocols.
- Business continuity, not just code compliance, drives modern design—fire protection must be evaluated based on uptime and recovery impact.
- Data resilience is a fire safety concern—the NIRS fire proved that systems without verified backups can lose data permanently.
- Human error and contractor oversight are fire risk factors—the NIRS fire was ruled a man-made disaster caused by incomplete power isolation, unqualified workers, and illegal subcontracting .
Take Action Today:
- Verify your facility complies with NFPA 75 (2024) and NFPA 76 (2024).
- Assess lithium-ion battery installations against NFPA 855 requirements.
- Evaluate aspirating smoke detection coverage in all ITE areas.
- Confirm clean agent systems have system-level approval, not just component certification.
- Develop and enforce battery handling and maintenance procedures.
- Coordinate with your fire service for pre-incident planning.
- Verify backup systems actually work—and test recovery.
- Document business continuity objectives and align fire protection accordingly.
Continue Reading from Our Series:
- Learn more: Fire Safety for Green Buildings: Balancing Sustainability and Safety
- Related guide: Understanding Smoke Control Systems in Commercial Buildings
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